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Ill THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN P. WHITCOME, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY AND HOARD OF 
REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 147If* 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant is appealing from a decision of the Board 
of Review, Industrial Commission of Utah denying unemployment 
benefits under the Employment Security Act of Utah Code Annotated 
[hereinafter cited as U. C. A.] 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Decision of the 
Board of the Board of Review and a deteirmination of benefits 
under the provisions of U. C. A. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, John P. Whitcome, responsible management 
employee at Valley Roofing Company, initiated a claim for 
unemployment benefits under the Employment Security Act on 
November 10, 1975. Valley Roofing Company is a corporation 
owned by Claimant and his wife, Carole Whitcome, President 
of the company. 
Appellant began working for Valley Roofing in 
May, 1974. He stopped working and effective October 27, 
1974 his benefits were assessed at $93.00 per week, $93.00 
effective March 23, 1975, under the extended benefit program. 
He began working again May 17, 1975. The weeks for which 
benefits have been denied are those ended April 5 - May 
24, 1976. Appellant worked for only one week in May for Which 
he was paid $200.00 Appellant received a check for $100.00 
in April which was a draw on future employment and not 
a wage as defined in the Code. During the remainder of 
the weeks, Appellant was unemployed. 
Upon filing for benefits on November 10, 1975, 
claimant indicated that he was hired by Valley Roofing 
Company on April 1, 1975 and Submitted a separation notice 
showing the same date. Then on December 4, 1975, the claimant 
signed a statement in which he stated that he began work 
-2-
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on or about April 7, 1975 and that he was paid $100.00 
during the week of April 12, 1975. mhis statement was 
written by John Warner, investigator for the Department 
after a conference with Appellant lasting approximately 
4 1/2 - 5 hours. 
Appellant is charged with knowingly failing to 
report material facts of his employment to obtain benefits 
under the Employment Security Act. As a result of this 
hearing held in the office of the Utah Department of Employment 
Security in Logan, Utah, Appellant was disqualified under 
provisions of Sec. 35 -4-5 (e) U. C. A. and ordered to 
repay $837.00 which he received for the weeks within his 
disqualification period. The Board of Review found the 
decision of the Appeals Referee to be supported by the 
evidence. Appellant brings this appeal on the grounds 
that the findings are not supported by the evidence* 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. APPELLANT, HAVING RECEIVED NO WAGES OR EARNINGS 
DURING ANY WEEKS CLAIMED AND HAVING MET ALL ELIGIBILITY 
REQUIREMENTS OF SEC. 35-4-4, IS THEREBY ENTITLED 
^0 BENEFITS UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT. 
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II. THE BOARD OF REVIEW ERRED IN NOT REVERSING 
THE APPEAL REFEREE'S DECISION BECAUSE THERE WAS 
NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN IT AND 
THERE WAS PROOF OF FACTS TO SHOW CLAIMANT'S 
RIGHT TO COMPENSATION. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE NO. I 
APPELLANT, HAVING RECEIVED NO WAGES OR EARNINGS 
DURING ANY WEEKS CLAIMED AND HAVING MET ALL ELIGIBILITY 
REQUIREMENTS OF SEC. 35-4-4, IS THEREBY ENTITLED 
TO BENEFITS UNDER THE EMPLOYEMENT SECURITY ACT. 
The primary question presented by the Board of 
Review's Decision is whether Appellant worked for any income 
or wage during the weeks ending April 5 - May 24, 1975, 
which he failed to report to the Department of Employment 
Security. While Section 35-4-10(h) U. C. A, provides that 
"[i]n any judicial proceeding under this section the findings 
of the Commission and the Board of Review as to the facts 
If- supported by evidence shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction 
of said court shall be confined to questions of law" (emphasis 
added), there is no uncontroverted substantial evidence 
which tends to show that Appellant was employed during 
the weeks in question. 
To be eligible for benefits, one must be unemployed 
as defined in Sec. 35-4-22 U.C.A. A person is unemployed 
"in any week during which he performs no services and with 
respect to which no wages are payble to him, or in any Digitized by t e Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
week ot less than tull time work if the wages payable to 
him with respect to such weeK are less tnan his weeKly 
I 
benefit amount. 
Appellant received no wages during tne weeks 
in question. A review of the checks, received as Exhinit 
8 the hearing, demonstrates that during the months of April 
and May, only the following checks were written to John 
Whitcome: 
Check #333 on 4/11/75 in the amount of $100.UO 
Check #356 on 5/19/75 in the amount ot $188.00 
Tne $100.00 check, however, was a araw on the 
tuture earnings of Valley Roofing's first job of the spring 
(Tr. 29). This amount was erroneously reported later in 
May as earnings (tr. 2^). The $18u.0i) check was earned 
was wages; however, this amount was properly reported as 
earnings for tte wcrk done during the weeK of May 17tn (Tr. 
28). This was the only week Appellant was employed during 
the weeks in question. 
MR. ANDERSON: okay,so in fact, before June 
1, 1975, wnat you1re saying is you worked 
one week in May. 
MR. WHITCOME: Right, and reported it. (Tr. 29). 
Under Section 35-4-2^ (p) U. C. A., wages "means all 
remuneration for personal services including commissions 
and bonuses and tne cash valye of all remuneration in any 
medium other tnan cash." 
-5-
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Clearly, an advance for living expenses does not become a "wage" 
under this detinition and Appellant should not be penalized. 
The fact that Appellant was not employed is substantiated 
also by the signed statements suDmittea by Valley Hoofing 
Company's first customers, Marlin C. Moth's statement is lucid: 
"Roof was installed approximately May ±5tn of 
197D. However, Valley Roofing had constructed 
the roof weeks ahead of time, but: was unable 
to install roof oecause of pad weather conditions. 
Had many problems in construction due to weather. 
(Exhibit 8) 
Aaron Tracy of Aaron Tracy Building Specialities 
stated: 
"Valley xoofing did a job for Aaron Tracy 
Builders, starting approximately May Iz, 
1975. This job had been ready weeks ahead 
of time, but due to weather we had, late 
snows in May and the first week in June, 
we were unable to have the job fully 
complete until tne middle of June." 
(Exhibit i) . 
Representations of E. A. Milier and Sons Packing, 
c., inc. also stated: 
"Weather did not permit Valley Roofing to start 
his work until the end of May." (Exhibit 10). 
The answer to why appellant did not commence 
worKing until April is clear. 
MR. ANDERSON: After that time do you have any 
recollection as to why you didn't get to working 
until the middle of May. 
-6-
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MR. WHITCOME: Yeah, it was because of the weather — 
last year the weather was really bad because 
at the same time the other roofers in the valley 
were crying they had work they couldn't get 
done. (Tr. 29). 
It is more than clear to one considering all the 
evidence that no wages were paid and no services were performed 
between the weeks ending April 5th and May 24, 1975 which 
were not reported. 
Further, Appellant complied with all eligibility 
requirements of Sec. 35-4-4 U. C. A. Appellant (1) had 
made claims in accordance with all regulations, (2) had 
registered for work, (3) was able to work, (4) was unemployed 
for a one week waiting period, (5) had furnished a separation 
sheet, and (6) had worked a cumulative 19 weeks during 
the base period, earning at least $20.00 each week. Appellant 
was properly unemployed during the weeks he claimed benefits. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE MO. II 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW ERRED IN NOT REVERSING 
THE APPEAL REFEREE'S DECISION BECAUSE THERE WAS 
NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN IT AND 
THERE WAS PROOF OF ^ACTS TO SHOW CLAIMANT•S 
RIGHT TO COMPENSATION. 
While the Supreme Court of Utah has established 
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that a "decision by the Commission will not be disturbed 
if reasonably supported by the evidence" (emphasis added) 
Child v Board of Review of Industrial Commission of State 
of Utah, 8 U 2d 239, 332 P. 2d 928 (1958), see also 
Johnson v Board of Review of Industrial Commission Depart-
ment of Employment Security, 7 U. 2d 113, 320 P. 2d 315 
(1958), the Court in a later case, restated its established 
rule of review regarding Review Board decisions. Significantly, 
a "reversal and the compelling of such an award of benefits 
could be justified only if there is no substantial evidence 
to sustain the determination and there was proof of facts 
giving rise to the right of compensation so clear and persuasive 
that the Commission's refusal to accept and make an award 
was clearly capricious, arbitrary and unreasonable." 
Kenhecott Copper Corp. Employees v Dept. of Employment Security, 
13 U. 2d 262, 372 P. 2d 987 (1962). 
Appellant is charged with knowingly withholding 
material facts of work and earnings in order to receive 
benefits to which he is not entitled. The evidence does not 
show any work which Appellant can be charged with doing 
during the weeks in question. Further, a determination that 
he had earnings of $184.61 for each of those weeks is clearly 
contrary to the evidence. 
-8-
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( 
The Board accepted April 1, 1975 as the true date 
on which employment began for Appellant, Barry Baker and 
David Whitcome. However, that date is inaccurate. 
REFEREE: Do you have a copy of that separation notice? 
MR. WHITCOME: No. 
REFEREE: Do you know what the dates are on that notice? 
MR. WHITCOME: He was laid off about the 1st or 2nd 
week in November. 
REFEREE: Did you have a starting date on that notice? 
MR. WHITCOME: Yeah, I did. 
REFEREE: What date was that? 
MR. WHITCOME: 4/1/75 
REFEREE: How did you arrive at that date? 
MR. WHITCOME: I guessed. I figured the unemployment 
office had the records — I didn't need to be that 
accurate. I didn't have the information available 
to me at the time when I filled them out. 
REFEREE: I'm curious as to how you always arrived 
at the figure of 4/1/75. 
MR. WHITCOME: Wellf its the beginning of the quarter 
— I knew he didn't work the quarter before but I 
knew he had worked in that quarter so I just did 
it like that. If you will look back, all the 
employees I did the same thing to. I realize 
I filled the forms out wrong but after they 
were sent in, then there's nothing you can do. 
# m — f\ n f\ \ 
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By his own admission, Mr. Archibald, auditor 
for the Department said that new employers are given the 
benefit of the doubt when records are lacking. 
MR. ARCHIBALD: For the year 1975. And seeing 
that there was no way of knowing if these wages 
were actually paid or not, and Valley Roofing 
being a new employer, we gave them the benefit 
of the doubt. We will work with new employers 
and this is one of our reasonings behind when 
we did this audit. (Tr. 10-11). 
Additional facts surrounding the weeks in question 
are germane. Mr. Warner, Department investigator stated 
that the date of April 1, 1975 had nothing to do with the 
commencement of work by Appellant. However, in his testimony 
just prior to that comment, he recognized the seasonal 
nature of the roofing business. 
MR. ANDERSON: Then you knew this when you filled 
out this form? The one I'm referring to is 6 30 
(b) excuse me 60 3 (b) — you knew they were roofers? 
MR. WARNER: Right 
MR. ANDERSON: Are you at all familiar — or 
were you familiar at that time with the seasonal 
nature of this work? -
MR. WARNER: I understand it's seasonal. 
MR. ANDERSON: Didn't you, in fact, then, when 
you went through all these dates when they 
all said April 1st, didn't you tend to wonder 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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i 
that there might be some leeway as related 
to the seasonal nature of this work? 
MR. WARNER: No, I don't see what April 1st would 
have to do with it. I feel — my understanding 
is that roofing can be done in January, February, 
April, May — any good day or good week — a 
person could go out and put a roof on any time 
of the year. (Tr. 15-16). 
Mr. Itfarner chose to ignore the fact that roofing 
is done piece-work whenever the weather is suitable, but generally 
during the spring and summer months. In particular, the spring , 
of 1975 was riddled with harsh weather well into April, May 
and June; it is totally consistent with Appellant's statement 
that he began working after April 1, 1975. In fact, the referee 
himself stated that he would wconcede that we had bad weather 
in the spring of • 75". (Tr. 29). 
In support thereof, signed written statements were 
admitted to the effect that Valley Roofing did not begin work 
for its customers until at least May 12, 1975. Marlin C. Hoth 
Construction (Exhibit 8), Aaron Tracy Builders (Exhibit 9), and 
Miller and Sons Packing (Exhibit 10) submitted statements that 
work by Valley Roofing had commenced on May 15, May 12 and the 
end of May consecutively. All cited bad weather conditions as 
the reason for the late date of construction work. (see point 
I). Thus, there is no substantial evidence to support the Board's 
11-
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Decision. 
Appellant's testimony that his use of April 1st as 
the date of employment was mistaken is consistent with the evidence 
notwithstanding any statements he made in error under pressure 
from Department representatives. 
In particular, the statement taken by Gerald Warner 
and signed by Appellant on December 4, 1976 is not reliable regarding 
the dates and admissions therein. First, the investigator had 
questioned him from 5:30 until at least 9:00 p.m. (Tr. 17) and 
both were apparently tired at the close of the session. In reference 
to the December 4th stateent, the Referee clarified the alleged 
essence of the statement. 
REFEREE: What it was saying is that you 
worked during the month of April and May and 
did not report the information because j 
you needed the unemployment benefits. 
MR. WHITCHOME: Yeah, but that is not the case 
because when we worked, we wrote it on the 
cards and sent it back in and when we 
didn't work we just put zero and 
sent it back in. 
REFEREE: How would Mr. Warner have gotten 
the information that you worked during 
April if you hadn't told him? 
-12-
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MR. WIIITCOME: A lot of thisr when he wrote 
it out he said what about this and this I 
said yeahf I don't know. And so he wrote 
it down and I signed it. (Tr. 17). 
To capitalize on Mr. Whitcome's confusion as to what 
wages were, Mr. Warner even wrote part of the document and dictated 
the remainder. 
MR. WHITCOME: Yeah, in fact he was the one telling 
me almost word for word what to write. He had 
written it down once and it didn't sound right 
so I just continued on from what he started. 
He'd been there quite awhile — by then I 
think he had writer's cramp. (Tr. 23). 
The evidence points not to a shrewd, deceptive claimant, 
but to a man unfamiliar with statutorily defined terms, such 
as wages, vainly attempting to justify his unintentional errors 
more than seven months later. When Mr. Warner confronted him 
with a check for $100.00 and dated April 11th, he apparently 
thought he needed to justify the check in some manner. This 
attempt at accountability is reiterated in the hearing testimony 
regarding the reporting of the $100.00 advance. (Tr. 18-19). 
Had Appellant intended to falsify his reports in 
order to defraud the Commission, he would certainly not have 
written the same date on all the employee's claims, including 
his own. That would only draw attention to such a scheme. Indeed 
attention was focused on the pattern and illuminated not a 
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fraud but to an admitted mistake. 
Secondly, there are facts which tend to show that the 
Board's Decision to deny compensation was unreasonable and, in 
fact, arbitrary and capricious based on the evidence. Appellant 
John Whitcome testified to the reasons for putting April 1st 
on the employee separation sheets. See Point I. The investigator's 
method of calculating the amount allegedly earned by Appellant 
based on the incorrect date is totally unacceptable as not reflective 
of the facts. Appellant could and did earn w$l,250.00 in only 
part of the second quarter due to the weather and nature of the 
roofing business. 
Also a function of the seasonal nature of the work 
is the fact that employees are paid for their work when the company 
is paid. (Tr. 30). None of the claimants receive a calculable 
weekly wage or salary, including Appellant. Since the busiest 
part of the season is in May and June, then in September and 
October (Tr. 27), it is completely consistent, in retrospect, 
that Appellant earned $1,250.00 in the last part of the quarter. 
(Tr. 35). To take this amount and divide it by the number of 
weeks in the quarter is an arbitrary exercise of power by the 
Department. The true employment picture is drastically altered 
by the Department's method of assessing earnings for each auarter. 
The Board's acceptance of this averaging of total pay has no 
relation to reality and does not provide substantial, if any, 
support for the Board's Decision. 
The Decision is also unreasonable in light of other 
-14-
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( 
< 
assumptions implicit in the Findings of Fact and Comments. *!o 
mention is made of either the adverse weather conditions during 
the spring of 1975 or of the seasonal nature of the roofing business 
in the Decision. Yet, these factors were clearly identified 
and, in fact, conceded to by the Referee and Mr, Warner consecutively. 
See point I. 
The adverse v/eather conditions of Spring, 1975, were 
reneatedly mentioned in reference to the actual starting 
date of employment for Appellant, Barry Raker and David TA7hitoome. 
Appellant identified to precise reasons that Valley Roofing's 
work began well into May. 
MR. ANDERSON: After that time do you have anv 
recollection as to why you didn't get to working 
until the middle of May. 
MR. TJHITCOME: Yeah, it was because of the v/eather 
last year the v/eather was really bad because 
at the same time the other roofers in the valley 
were crying they had work they couldn't get done. 
REFEREE: I will concede that we had bad weather 
in spring of '75". (Tr. 29). 
™ho statements of three of Valley Roofing's first 
customers are in support of this fact. Also see point I, 
Exhibits 3, 9, 10.) 
-15-
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The seasonal nature of the roofing business is 
also ignored by the Board in the very face of testimony to 
that effect. The following is consistent with the information 
provided by Valley Roofing's customers marked Exhibits 8-
10: 
REFEREE: During January, February and March, were 
you trying to time up any jobs for the spring? 
MR. WHITCOME: Yeah, in-fact, we had some jobs 
lined up from the previous year we could have 
done if the weather would have broke a little 
earlier but it snowed all the way into 
the first week in June it snowed. Basically, 
I do hot work. That's a little different 
than shingling — maybe it's nice today but 
if it rained yesterday I wouldn't be able 
to work today — you have to work 2-3 days 
consecutively to be warm and dry before you 
can do a hot roof. It's a little different. 
REFEREE: Do you do any other types of roofs? 
Asphalt shingles — cedar shingles? 
MR. WHITCOME: yes. 
REFEREE : You don't have to wait on those jobs? 
MR. WHITCOME: You have to wait until they're ready. 
-16-
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( 
Generally builders here only pour foundations 
twice a year. They pour them come spring along 
about May or June — the job's ready to roof 
and usually thatfs our biggest boom because 
the contractors have been sitting almost all 
winter. Then comes about September and October 
and they dig holes like crazy and try to get 
the roofs on them and then they let them sit 
so their men can work inside all winter. So 
those are our two biggest times. (Tr. 26-27). 
The seasonal nature of the work was even admitted by Mr. 
Warner earlier in the proceedings. (Tr. 15-16). 
Further substantiation of the irregular work schedule 
of roofers is evident from a careful examination of the checks 
in Exhibit 3. There were no large checks written for supplies 
or labor until May 14 when a check for $1,285.90 was written 
to Cantwell Brothers Supply and one for $188.00 was written 
to David Whitcome on May 16, 1975. It is significant that 
none of the above information was gleaned from the hearing 
and used in the determination by the Board. 
To deny Appellant relief is not consistent with 
the purpose of the Employment Security Act. The act should 
be "liberally construed to best effectuate its purpose. 
It is directed to meeting those needs of unemployment workers. 
First, it is to enable them to find suitable work; second 
it is to provide cash benefits during periods of unemployment." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Gocke v Wiesley, 18 U. 2d 245, .420 P. 2d 44, 46 (1966), See 
also, Townsend v Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 27, 
U 2d 94, 453 P. 2d 614 (1972). If the goal is to provide 
cash benefits to eligible unemployed, this purpose is not 
well served by the Decision. A liberal construction would 
not tolerate a penalty for claimant's error when part of the 
Department's supervisory role is to aid new employers in 
establishing good business accounting procedures. 
The Honorable Stanley 0. Griffin apparently failed 
to consider any testimony concerning the weather conditions 
and nature of the roofing business in Appellant's particular 
case, choosing instead to base his decision on only part of 
the evidence presented. The hearing reflected the weaknesses 
of nonadversary proceedings with the hearing officer from the 
Department of Employment Security relying totally on the evidence 
presented by the Department's own investigators. 
CONCLUSION 
The Decision of the Board of Review does not 
reflect an accurate consideration of all evidence presented. 
There is, in fact, no substantial evidence on which the Board 
can rely to prove its allegation that Appellant withheld any 
material facts. The only evidence presented by the Department 
showed a claimant confounded by the requirements of the 
Employment Security Act implementation procedures. 
This evidence is more than offset, however, by the 
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Board's acceptance and reliance on a totally unacceptable 
method for assessing weekly income. Taking the quarter earninqs 
and dividing arbitrarily by the number of weeks in that quarter 
does not necessarily demonstrate how much a claimant made 
for each week. This method should be eschewed on appeal in 
favor of a more rational approach to determination based on 
all evidence presented. In the instant casef the seasonal 
nature of the work should have been considered. The inclement 
weather of spring, 1975 should also enter into a determination 
especially since it was conceded by the Referee. Together, 
these neglected elements support the testimony of Barry Baker, 
David Whitcome and John Whitcome that they began work after 
April 1st. 
Since there is no substantial evidence to support 
the Decision while there is proof of facts giving rise to 
the right to compensation, the decision may be reversed. 
Here, where Appellant provided information to the best of 
his ability as a roofer, he should not be denied the benefits 
of the Employment Security Act which purpose is to provide 
cash benefits to the unemployed. 
Since he did meet the eligibility requirements of 
Sec. 35-4-4 u# C. A. and for the reasons stated above, 
Appellant prays the Court to reverse the Decision of the Board 
of Review and to award Appellant his due benefits. 
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